Meadow Valley Contractors, Inc. v. State of Utah Department of Transportation : Reply Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2009
Meadow Valley Contractors, Inc. v. State of Utah
Department of Transportation : Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Kent B. Scott; Justin E. Scott; Cody W. Wilson; Babcock, Scott and Babcock; Attorneys for Plaintiff
Appellee and Cross-Appellant Meadow Valley Contractors, Inc.
Troy L. Booher; Dan R. Larsen; Special Assistant Attorneys General; Snell and Wlmer, L.L.P.;
Randy S. Hunter; Assistant Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Attorney General; Attorneys for
Defendant Appellant and Cross-Appellee State of Utah Department of Transportation.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Meadow Valley Contractors v. Utah Department of Transportation, No. 20090025.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2009).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/2885
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 









Supreme Court No. 20090025-SC 
Appeal from Third Judicial District 
Court, Honorable John Paul Kennedy, 
District Court No. 050909139 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF AND 
RESPONSE BRIEF ON CROSS-APPEAL 
Kent B. Scott 
Justin E. Scott 
Cody W. Wilson 
Babcock Scott & Babcock 
505 East 200 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee and 
Cross-Appellant Meadow Valley 
Contractors, Inc. 
Troy L. Booher (9419) 
Dan R. Larsen (4865) 
Special Assistant Attorneys General 
SNELL & WiLMER L.L.P. 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1004 
Telephone: (801) 257-1900 
Facsimile: (801) 257-1800 
Randy S. Hunter (9084) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Mark L.Shurtleff (4666) 
Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 140857 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0857 
Telephone: (801) 366-0353 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant and 
Cross-Appellee State of Utah 
Department of TransportationFILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 









Supreme Court No. 20090025-SC 
Appeal from Third Judicial District 
Court, Honorable John Paul Kennedy, 
District Court No. 050909139 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF AND 
RESPONSE BRIEF ON CROSS-APPEAL 
Kent B. Scott 
Justin E. Scott 
Cody W. Wilson 
Babcock Scott & Babcock 
505 East 200 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee and 
Cross-Appellant Meadow Valley 
Contractors, Inc. 
Troy L. Booher (9419) 
Dan R. Larsen (4865) 
Special Assistant Attorneys General 
SNELL & WlLMER L.L.P. 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1004 
Telephone: (801) 257-1900 
Facsimile: (801) 257-1800 
Randy S. Hunter (9084) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Mark L. Shurtleff (4666) 
Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 140857 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0857 
Telephone: (801) 366-0353 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant and 
Cross-Appellee State of Utah 
Department of Transportation 
Table of Contents 
Page 
Preliminary Considerations Dispositive of Issues on Appeal 1 
Summary of the Argument 2 
Argument 5 
I. MVC Cannot Recover Damages It Did Not Incur 5 
II. UDOT Could Not Breach the Contract By Altering the Project 
Because the Contract Contemplates That UDOT Can Alter the 
Project 9 
III. MVC Waived Any Claim to Additional Compensation by Failing to 
Comply With the Notice Provisions and Dispute Resolution 
Procedures 12 
IV. UDOT Did Not Waive or Modify the Notice Provisions; Nor Is 
UDOT Estopped from Enforcing the Notice Provisions 15 
A. UDOT Did Not Waive MVC's Notice Obligations 16 
B. UDOT Did Not Modify the Notice Provisions 20 
C. UDOT Is Not Estopped From Enforcing the Notice 
Provisions 21 
Conclusion 22 
UDOT's Response Brief Regarding MVC's Cross-Appeal 23 
Argument 24 
I. The Trial Court Did Not Clearly Err in Interpreting the Thickness 
Provisions 24 
II. The Trial Court Did Not Clearly Err In Rejecting MVC's Date of 
Accrual for Prejudgment Interest of November 11, 2003, Because 
the Final Payment to MVC Under the Contract Did Not Occur Until 
After July 21, 2005 28 
Conclusion 29 
i 
Addendum 1: Claims Prosecution and Tolling Agreement ("assignment") dated July 1, 
2004 
Addendum 2: Letter dated April 26, 2005 from Carlos M. Braceras, Deputy Director, 
Utah Department of Transportation, to Cody W. Wilson, counsel for 
Meadow Valley Contractors, Inc. 
Addendum 3: Excerpts of general contract relating to paving thickness 
n 
Table of Authorities 
Cases Page 
14th St. Gvm, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 
2008 UT App 127, 183 P.3d 262 23 
Bailey v. Bayles, 
2002 UT 58, 52 P.3d 1158 25 
Barry, Bette & Led Duke, Inc. v. New York, 
240 A.D.2d 54 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) 8 
Interstate Contracting Corp. v. City of Dallas, 
135 S.W.3d 605 (Tex. 2004) 8 
Kimball v. Campbell. 
699 P.2d 714 (Utah 1985) 23,26 
Nielsen v. Gold's Gym, 
2003 UT 37, 78 P.3d 600 26 
Roof-Techs Int'l v. State, 
57 P.3d 538 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002) 8 
SME Indus., Inc. v. Thompson, Ventulett, Stainback & Assocs., 
2001 UT 54, 28 P.3d 669 5, 8, 25 
Severin v. United States, 
99 Ct. CI. 435 (1943) 7 
Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 
857 P.2d 935 (Utah 1993) 19 
State v. Dean, 
2004 UT 63, 95 P.3d 276 8 
State v. Eldredge, 
773 P.2d 29 (Utah 1989) 9 
State v. Ross, 
2007 UT 89, 174 P.3d 628 8 
Thorn Construction Company, Inc. v. Utah Department of Transportation. 
598 P.2d 365 (Utah 1976) 14-15 
in 
Wilcox v. Anchor Wate Co., 
2007 UT 39, 164 P.3d 353 23 
Youngblood v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 
2007 UT 28,158 P.3d 1088 21 
Other Authorities 
Philip L. Bruner & Patrick J. O'Connor, Jr., 3 Bruner and O'Connor on 
Construction Law § 8:51 (2009) 7 
IV 
Preliminary Considerations Dispositive of Issues on Appeal 
A few undisputed facts are dispositive of the issues on appeal. Because the Utah 
Department of Transportation (UDOT) accepts—for purposes of appeal—that the UDOT 
engineer altered the paving project by prohibiting ribbon paving, UDOT raises only three 
issues: (i) whether Meadow Valley Contractors, Inc. (MVC), the general contractor, may 
recover damages incurred by Southwest Asphalt Paving, the subcontractor; (ii) whether 
UDOT breached the general contract with MVC by verbally altering the project where 
the contract contemplates UDOT altering the project; and (iii) whether MVC complied 
with notice provisions that are conditions precedent to MVC receiving additional 
compensation, and, if not, whether UDOT may enforce those provisions. 
What complicates the analysis is the fact that MVC, and the trial court, insists 
upon referring to Southwest or MVC as "MVC/Southwest." The analysis becomes 
straightforward, however, when Southwest and MVC are treated as separate entities, 
which MVC admits they are. MVC is a plaintiff and party to the general contract with 
UDOT. (Resp. Br. at 6.) Southwest is the assignee of MVC s claims, but is neither a 
party to this lawsuit nor a party to the general contract with UDOT. (Id, at 10.) 
With Southwest and MVC properly distinguished, a few facts become dispositive. 
First, Southwest incurred all damages; MVC incurred none. (Id. at 28.) In fact, after 
UDOT denied MVC's belated request for additional compensation, MVC signed a "final 
estimate" in which MVC agreed that UDOT had paid MVC all compensation due under 
the contract.1 (Trial Ex. 41.) Second, MVC's Rule 30(b)(6) representative testified that 
1
 "Has Meadow Valley been paid the full amount that was due and owing by UDOT 
under the contract? I believe so." (R. 1424:691.) 
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MVC (i) did not believe the UDOT engineer had altered the project2 and (ii) never 
provided UDOT notice of any kind, written or verbal, that MVC believed the UDOT 
engineer had altered the project.3 (R. 1424:553-54.) Finally, MVC's representative 
testified that MVC understood MVC's compliance with the notice provision was a 
condition precedent to receiving additional compensation, and therefore, UDOT could 
not have caused MVC to understand otherwise.4 (R. 1424:552-55.) 
Therefore, according to MVC—the plaintiff—(i) MVC did not believe the UDOT 
engineer had altered the project by prohibiting ribbon paving; (ii) MVC never provided 
UDOT notice that the engineer had altered the projet; (iii) MVC was aware that providing 
UDOT notice was a condition precedent to receiving additional compensation; and 
(iv) MVC incurred none of the damages awarded to MVC in this lawsuit. 
Summary of the Argument 
MVC's response brief confirms that MVC is asking this court to change Utah law 
applicable to construction contracts. This court should reject MVC's arguments not only 
because they are contrary to Utah law but also because they reflect bad public policy. 
First, MVC argues that it can recover damages incurred only by Southwest. 
Adopting MVC's position would require this court to overrule recent precedent holding 
that the assignee of a claim (here, Southwest) may not recover its own damages, but only 
2
 Even after the project, MVC forwarded Southwest's claim that UDOT had altered the 
project "without taking any position on whether the claim was valid or whether [MVC] 
agreed with it." (R. 1424:525.) 
"At any time during the paving project did you have an understanding that Meadow 
Valley was initiating a contract dispute or the contract claim provisions under the 
contract? No." (R. 1424:552.) 
4
 "And is it your understanding that Meadow Valley was required to promptly notify the 
engineer of any alleged changes to the contract? Yes." (R. 1424:552.) 
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those damages incurred by the assignor (here, MVC), MVC articulates nothing unique 
illlnmil linn » i (tsc lli.il w 11111nI:i ifiinimi1 Hi ill prrmlnil V\ linn M1 'I ' assigned ils i Lliiiii ID 
Southwest, Southwest waived any claim aiMinst MVC1 for additional compensation, and 
therefore, it is irrelevant whethci Southwest evei had a (oioiable claim against MV< * 
At the time MVC filed this lawsuit, it had suffered no damages, or at least none of the 
damages it was awarded hy the trial court This issue is dispositive. 
Scvomll Ml i ii| in llifiil I 11 M HI In niched the IM mri ill union il i illi IM" ( >» \n n 
the Ul KJT engineer verbally altered the project, even though the contract expressly 
contemplates that the 11 Ml M engineer could alter the project vei bally as conditions 
demanded. Adopting MVC's position would invalidate such contract provisions, which 
appear in every UDOT contract to permit engineers to order whatever work is necessary. 
This ISSIK nil o i ilisjioMiivt Ihn uisr Ihc li i il MHIII mil hi i In oi i i nli.ii I i iiiiliii i III ill 
I HI »OT breached the contract when its engineer vcihallv altered the project. 
I IIIIcI il\l I aiguen that Southwest s verbal complaints that the construetion 
project would cost more than Southwest had anticipated when it submitted its bid to 
MVC satisfied MVC's obligation to provide written notice that MVC believed UDOT 
In ml illi inl tin'pin|n I \il<iplmr MV< ' \ pu* liion in ill nl> < iiiilil mo. iiliitlih \^  irit I IIII 
notice requirements, but also would invalidate any requirements that notice be provided 
I i i iiliiteting pail) I  lit" IIII lu i pirn IMOII> HI I HI il I I i onion Is an1 iinpniUiil ha .tu>r 
they allow UDOT to review any contention that its engineer has altered a project at a time 
5
 In fact, Southwest did not have a colorable claim because it is undisputed Southwest 
failed to comply with the noliee provisions in its subcontract with MVC, something lint 
operated to waive any claim to additional compensation: "Failure to so notify [MVC] 
will constitute a waiver of all such claims " (Add, C to Opening Br., Trial Ex. 9 § 5.3.) 
K I S I < H I 3 
UDOT can (i) determine whether the cost of additional compensation outweighs the 
benefits of altering the project and (ii) obtain federal government approval if additional 
costs will exceed $25,000. Here, MVC's failure to provide UDOT any notice denied 
UDOT the opportunity to review the engineer's alteration or to obtain federal government 
approval before the project began. This issue also is dispositive because MVC's failure 
to comply with the notice provisions operates as a waiver of additional compensation. 
Fourth, MVC argues that UDOT waived, modified, or is estopped from enforcing 
the notice provisions in the general contract because the UDOT engineer verbally 
prohibited Southwest from ribbon paving months before, and during, the project. This 
argument remains puzzling. It is the UDOT engineer's altering the project that triggers 
the contractual notice requirements; his altering the project cannot also excuse the need to 
comply with the contractual notice requirements. 
For all of these reasons, the trial court erred when it (i) ruled that UDOT breached 
the general contract by doing something contemplated in the contract; (ii) awarded MVC 
damages that MVC did not incur; and (iii) excused MVC's failure to provide UDOT with 
any notice required under the contract based upon the actions of a third party, Southwest. 
The only way these rulings make sense is if MVC and Southwest are the same entity, 
which explains why MVC refuses to refer to itself separately in its response brief and 
instead uses the term "MVC/Southwest" throughout. MVC and Southwest are not the 
same entity, something that undermines nearly every argument MVC makes in the 
response brief and nearly every ruling made by the trial court. 
This court not only should vacate the judgment entered by the trial court, but also 
should remand with instructions to enter judgment in favor of UDOT. 
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Argument 
This M'M ! 'V "< ^ Mnptin^ lo rcnv n 
damages incurred by a separate entity Southwest soi \imly prohibited under 
I Jtah la w !M . • III1 i i g i i i e e r 
b r eached the contract b y verba l ly a h o n n p the project h<f the con t rac t express ly 
con templa tes that the eng ineer coulu u i iu IIH. piojci i M. * Un . iu ( a s s u m i n g the 
c n g i n r r r u l lcrni IIK pni)fTl f;onic itiin^ \«! K -! -H ,. |.;. ;
 r i , , j .oscs <«! appeal M V<1 
e
 .o comply with the contractual notice provisions that are conditions precedent for 
M/T „111\ additional n nmpi us.ilium sli'immn,11 Ihiin lln dillai Hums. 
*. MVC Cannot Recover Damages It Did Not Incur 
H. (he opening i.-. .* - .. ;..., ^ ,„„. • ouii committed plain error in 
-iwardinp- MVC d; ' " w- * ?d not uicui. ^Opening Br. at 24-28.) Moie specifically 
I DO i cited a recent decision of this court holding thai an assignee of a claim T I 
P ! - • . . ,1^ • -co 
instead may recover only damages incurred by the assignor,, in this case MVC SMF 
Indus., Inc. v." Ihompson, \cntutctu Stainback & Assocs., JOII I III ill *! H), - : 
("because SME's implied warranty claim is an assigned claim, SME may not recover the 
damages it suffered"). Because the trial court awarded MVC damages incurred b) • 
Southwest this i mill should » .ir.ilf tlir niilpmnit nilrn i\ in l.i m ut'MV (1 
In response, MVC does not cite, let alone address, SMI Instead, MVC first 
assei ts that IN 1 V C iiiciii i ed the damages awarded 'b'( I IK HI > » \\\ ; 
uAtxxxic4tcK r e spons ib le for pe r fo rming the p a v i n g w o r k u n d e r its con t rac t wi th I JD01 ' 
(Resp, bi. di 2 - )n the next page of the response brief, however, M V C admits, as it 
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must, that MVC did not incur those damages because it "passed along the loss to 
Southwest"6 pursuant to its subcontract, by which MVC made Southwest responsible for 
performing the paving work. (Resp. Br. at 28.) After conceding that MVC did not incur 
the damages awarded by the trial court, MVC argues that MVC nonetheless was harmed 
because absent the assignment of MVC s claims to Southwest, "MVC and Southwest 
would have litigated the issue of extra costs between each other." (Resp. Br. at 29.) 
Of course, "would have litigated" is not the same as "did successfully litigate," 
especially where Southwest and MVC agreed that the assignment would "resolve all 
aspects of the Block Paving Claim as between [Southwest] and MVC in connection with 
the Project."7 (R. 1184.) Specifically, MVC represented that "[b]y executing this 
[assignment], MVC does not acknowledge responsibility for any such claim of 
[Southwest] or acknowledge that such request is valid or timely." (R. 1184.) Therefore, 
assuming MVC ever had liability stemming from the prohibition on ribbon paving— 
which it did not—by the time MVC filed this lawsuit, all liability had been extinguished. 
Recognizing that problem, MVC ultimately relies upon a policy argument: "if 
UDOT's theory on this point was adopted, it would have the effect of nullifying virtually 
all liquidating agreements entered into between general contractors and subcontractors, 
and prevent subcontractors from bringing actions on behalf of general contractors against 
owners." (Resp. Br. at 30.) Apart from failing to distinguish SME, this argument 
6
 In fact, Southwest did not even do that with additional costs related to paving because 
MVC never incurred any losses to "pass along." Instead, Southwest directly incurred any 
additional costs associated with the paving. What MVC "passed along" were fines and 
penalties UDOT assessed to MVC and MVC "passed along" to Southwest. 
7
 UDOT did not reference the assignment in the opening brief because it was discussed 
but not admitted at trial. UDOT references it here because MVC refers to the assignment 
in the response brief. A copy of the assignment is attached at Addendum 1. 
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assumes that all contractors must do what MVC and Southwest did in this lawsuit. That 
assumption is incorrect. 
First, as MVC concedes, "Southwest could have brought suit directly against 
MVC for the damages," which in turn would have prompted MVC to file its claim 
against UDOT, thereby placing all relevant parties before the court.8 (Resp. Br. at 23.) 
Southwest did not "bring suit directly against MVC" because Southwest's failure to 
comply with the notice requirements in the subcontract meant that its claim against MVC 
would fail as a matter of law. Under the subcontract, Southwest's "[fjailure to so notify 
[MVC] will constitute a waiver of all such claims." (Add. C to Opening Br.; Trial Ex. 9 
§ 5.3.) 
Second, even if Southwest's claim against MVC would not have failed as a matter 
of law, its claim was extinguished in the assignment agreement before MVC filed this 
lawsuit against UDOT. (Add. 1.) And in the assignment, MVC expressly refused to 
acknowledge that Southwest's claim against MVC "is valid or timely." (R. 1184.) Thus, 
the actions of MVC and Southwest extinguished any claim MVC had against UDOT; it 
was not extinguished by some defect in Utah law. As the trial court recognized, by the 
time of trial "[w]hatever the outcome, they [MVC] were covered. They didn't care," and 
Had Southwest complied with the notice provisions in the subcontract, then MVC 
would have been contractually obligated to pursue a timely claim with UDOT. (Add. C 
to Opening Br., Trial Ex. 9 § 5.2.) Such provisions are common and allow subcontractors 
to obligate general contractors to pursue claims and avoid just the circumstances here. 3 
Bruner and O'Connor on Construction Law § 8:51 (explaining that contractors are 
"incorporating language in the agreement that obligates the general contractor to present 
the subcontractor's claims to the government" to avoid the holding of Severin v. United 
States, 99 Ct. CI. 435 (1943) that if a general contractor has no liability to a 
subcontractor, the owner has no liability to the general contractor). Here, it is undisputed 
that Southwest failed to comply with the notice provisions in the subcontract and MVC 
failed to comply with the notice provisions in the general contract. 
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they "did not have a dog in this fight." (R. 1425:993-94; 1424:574.) MVCs policy 
argument is beside the point.9 
Finally, MVC argues that this court should not reach this issue under a plain error 
standard. Because the error exists and was harmful to UDOT (no damages but for the 
error), the only issue is whether it "should have been obvious to the trial court" that MVC 
could not recover Southwest's damages where UDOT pointed out to the trial court that 
(i) the damages presented at trial were incurred only by Southwest and (ii) Southwest is 
not a party. State v. Ross, 2007 UT 89, f 17, 174 P.3d 628. Under Utah law, an error is 
obvious when "the law governing the error was clear at the time the alleged error was 
made." State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, f 16, 95 P.3d 276. Here, at the time of trial Utah law 
was clear that an assignee cannot recover its own damages when prosecuting an assigned 
claim. SME, 2001 UT 54, f^ 30. UDOT has thus satisfied the elements of plain error. 
Furthermore, as UDOT pointed out in the opening brief (Opening Br. at 27-29), 
given the issues UDOT did raise before the trial court, the trial court should have 
recognized it was inappropriate to award MVC damages incurred by Southwest. State v. 
9
 If MVC had admitted liability to Southwest in the assignment instead of expressly 
denying it, then MVC may have had standing to recover damages. In jurisdictions that 
recognize "liquidation agreements" between general contractors and subcontractors, the 
general contractor (MVC) must admit liability to the subcontractor (Southwest) to 
provide a legal basis to recover damages from the owner (UDOT). Interstate Contracting 
Corp. v. City of Dallas, 135 S.W.3d 605, 610 (Tex. 2004) ("In a liquidation agreement: 
(1) the contractor acknowledges its liability to the subcontractor, thereby providing the 
general contractor with a basis for legal action against the owner; (2) the general 
contractor's liability is liquidated to the extent of its recovery against the owner; and (3) 
the general contractor agrees to pass its recovery to the subcontractor.") (emphasis 
added); Roof-Techs Int'l v. State, 57 P.3d 538, 552 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002) (general 
contractor must "acknowledged its liability" in liquidation agreement); Barry, Bette & 
Led Duke, Inc. v. New York, 240 A.D.2d 54, 57 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) ("Absent a 
showing of actual contractual liability in claimant, there can be no liquidating 
agreement."). 
10519317 8 
Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah 1989) (obviousness can also be shown by what the trial 
court knew at the time of the rulings). 
This court should reaffirm that an assignee cannot recover its own damages when 
prosecuting assigned claims, especially where the assignor (MVC) has denied any 
liability to the assignee (Southwest) that could conceivably have served as a basis to 
combine the assignee's damages with the assignor's cause of action. Here, the trial 
court's error in awarding MVC damages incurred by Southwest should have been 
obvious in light of SME. This court should vacate the judgment in favor of MVC. 
II. UDOT Could Not Breach the Contract By Altering the Project Because the 
Contract Contemplates That UDOT Can Alter the Project 
The trial court also erred in ruling that UDOT breached the general contract when 
the UDOT engineer verbally altered the project to preclude ribbon paving. In short, that 
ruling is incorrect as a matter of law because the contract expressly contemplates that the 
UDOT engineer can alter the project. (Opening Br. at 29-30.) 
In response, MVC claims that (i) UDOT waived this issue by failing to raise it in 
the trial court; (ii) the contract permitted UDOT to alter the project only via "written 
changes;" and (iii) the trial court, in fact, ruled that UDOT breached the general contract 
by refusing to pay additional monies to MVC, not simply by altering the project. (Resp. 
Br. at 32-36.) Each of these claims fails. 
First, UDOT raised the argument in its trial brief and during closing arguments by 
citing contract provisions that allowed the UDOT engineer to change the project, which, 
in turn, triggered MVC's obligation to provide notice that it believed the UDOT engineer 
had materially altered the project. (R. 1274; see also 1425:1011.) The specific contract 
10519317 9 
provision is section 1.7(A). This section is titled "Notification of Differing Site 
Conditions, Changes and Extra Work" and provides that MVC must "[p]romptly notify 
the Engineer of alleged changes to the Contract due to differing site conditions, extra 
work, altered work beyond the scope of the Contract, or actions taken by the Department 
that change the Contract terms and conditions." (Add. C to Opening Br.; R. 1274.) 
UDOT argued in the alternative that if the UDOT engineer altered the project— 
something UDOT accepts for purposes of appeal—then MVC waived any claim to 
additional compensation by failing to comply with the notice provisions, an argument 
that presupposes UDOT did not breach the contract by altering the project. (R. 1274-76.) 
Second, the contract does not contemplate only written changes to the project. 
There are two provisions that govern changes. Section 1.5(A) provides that "[t]he 
Engineer reserves the right at any time during the work to make written changes in 
quantities and alterations in the work that are necessary to satisfactorily complete the 
project." (Add. C to Opening Br. (emphasis added).) UDOT does not need MVC to 
provide UDOT notice of such changes because UDOT is aware of the change when it 
provides written notice. In contrast, section 1.7(A) provides that MVC must "[p]romptly 
notify the Engineer of alleged changes to the Contract due to differing site conditions, 
extra work, altered work beyond the scope of the Contract, or actions taken by the 
Department that change the Contract terms and conditions." (Id.) 
The only sensible reading of section 1.7(A) is that the engineer may, without 
complying with the written notification requirement in section 1.5(A), change site 
conditions, order extra work, or alter the work described in the contract. Section 1.5(A) 
governs changes the engineer knowingly and deliberately makes to the contract, whereas 
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section 1.7(A) governs changes the engineer makes to the project where, as here, the 
engineer does not believe he has altered the project through his verbal directions to 
contractors. This explains why (i) any change governed by section 1.7(A) is described as 
an "alleged" change, (ii) MVC must "[immediately notify the Engineer verbally of the 
alleged change or extra work," and (iii) MVC must then provide additional information 
"within 5 calendar days." (Add. C to Opening Br.) None of these provisions govern a 
written change under section 1.5(A), the only type of change that must be in writing. 
Third, the trial court did not rule that UDOT breached the general contract by 
failing to pay additional compensation. Instead, the trial court ruled that the breach was 
the UDOT engineer's altering the project. The trial court's rulings are as follows: 
UDOT's decision to prohibit ribbon paving where it would result in 
a greater than two inch vertical separation grade interfered with the 
method and means by which the asphalt paving should have been 
allowed to be performed by Meadow Valley/Southwest and 
constitutes a material breach of the contract by UDOT. 
UDOT breached its contract with Meadow Valley in directing 
Meadow Valley/Southwest not to use the ribbon style method on 
portions of the Project. 
UDOT breached its contract with Meadow Valley in misinterpreting 
and misapplying the asphalt paving specifications. 
(R. 1519 (emphasis added).) The fact that the trial court awarded damages as a result of 
the alleged breach does not transform the breach of contract theory into one that UDOT 
breached the contract by failing to pay additional compensation. 
Perhaps recognizing this problem, MVC relies upon a policy argument, which 
demonstrates the opposite of what MVC supposes: "If the Court were to accept UDOT's 
logic that UDOT would not breach the contract because the contract allows UDOT to 
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alter/change the Project, then UDOT would be able to make changes/alterations in all of 
its projects (involving the same contract language UDOT cites [section 1.7(A)]) and be 
under no obligation to pay for any increased costs due to the changes/alterations." (Resp. 
Br. at 36-37.) 
Were MVC correct, section 1.7 would provide UDOT immunity in altering the 
project, but, of course, section 1.7 does no such thing because the section does not end at 
1.7(A). Instead, section 1.7 provides that MVC may be entitled to additional 
compensation if MVC provides UDOT (i) notice of the alleged change, (ii) information 
about additional costs, and (iii) an opportunity to determine whether the change was 
worth the additional costs. Had MVC complied, its theory would have been that UDOT 
breached the contract by failing to pay MVC for additional work. Instead, MVC did not 
comply with the notice provisions, so the trial court ruled that the UDOT engineer 
breached the contract by altering the project. The policy argument is a red herring. 
In the end, the only breach of contract theory in play is that UDOT breached the 
contract when the UDOT engineer altered the project. Because this theory fails as a 
matter of law, the trial court erred in ruling otherwise. This court should reverse. 
III. MVC Waived Any Claim to Additional Compensation by Failing to Comply 
With the Notice Provisions and Dispute Resolution Procedures 
A third ground for vacating the judgment entered in favor of MVC is that, even if 
(i) MVC were seeking its own damages and (ii) the UDOT engineer had altered the 
project by prohibiting ribbon paving, MVC nonetheless waived any right to additional 
compensation by failing to provide UDOT timely notice that it considered the engineer's 
prohibition on ribbon paving to constitute a material alteration of the project that 
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warranted additional compensation. In the opening brief, UDOT pointed out that 
MVC—the plaintiff and only other party to the general contract—provided UDOT no 
written or verbal notice, a failure that operated as a waiver of any claim to additional 
compensation. (Opening Br. at 30-35.) Consistent with this, the trial court found that 
MVC failed to comply "strictly" with these notice provisions.10 (R. 1511.) 
In response, MVC argues that UDOT had adequate verbal notice from Southwest 
to satisfy MVC's written notice obligation. In essence, MVC argues that verbal notice is 
an adequate substitute for written notice under Utah law. (Resp. Br. at 37.) While 
UDOT contends that a sophisticated party like MVC cannot satisfy an express provision 
that requires immediate verbal, and within 5 days detailed written, notice by providing 
only verbal notice, this court need not reach that issue. What MVC does not address, but 
what is dispositive, is that MVC never provided any notice, written or verbal. Instead, 
the only entity that disputed the engineer's interpretation of the project was Southwest, 
and under the general contract MVC had to provide UDOT written authorization to deal 
directly with Southwest with regard to changes in the contract price, something MVC 
never provided. (R. 1424:528.) 
In the end, because MVC testified that it did not believe the UDOT engineer 
altered the project, MVC could not have notified UDOT that it believed the engineer 
The general contract is clear concerning the importance of the notice provisions: 
(i) MVC's "failure to provide required notice under this article constitutes a waiver of 
any and all claims that may arise as a result of the alleged change;" (ii) UDOT "does not 
grant additional compensation if verbal and/or written notification is not given;" and 
(iii) full compliance with the notification requirements "is a contractual condition 
precedent to the right to seek judicial relief." (Add. B to Opening Br., Trial Ex. 103 at 
57, 75, 78.) 
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altered the project.11 And because MVC did not provide UDOT verbal or written 
notice, MVC's discussion of under what circumstances a party can satisfy a written 
notice requirement with verbal notice is beside the point. 
Moreover, in addressing the written notice requirement, the only case MVC relies 
upon—Thorn Construction Company, Inc. v. Utah Department of Transportation, 598 
P.2d 365 (Utah 1976)—does not support its position. (Resp. Br. at 37-38.) As an initial 
matter, Thorn does not involve a third party's providing verbal notice to satisfy a 
contracting party's written notice requirement, the circumstance present here. In 
addition, in Thorn the UDOT engineer "agreed to pay [Thorn] for the extra expenses." 
Id. at 369 (emphasis added). Thorn upheld a damage award for those expenses because 
the notice provision applied only to work "not clearly covered in the contract or not 
ordered by the engineer as extra work as defined herein." Id. (emphasis added). The 
court held that the provision did "not contemplate the necessity of a written order in a 
case such as this, where the project engineer, not the contractor, causes extra work to be 
11
 MVC has never disputed that UDOT's interpretation of the project. (R. 1424:539-40.) 
After the project, MVC merely forwarded Southwest's claim "without taking any 
position on whether the claim was valid or whether [MVC] agreed with it." 
(R. 1424:525.) Throughout the project, MVC repeatedly and expressly refused to take 
any position on the matter. (Trial Ex. 16 at 1 ("UDOT specifications also dictate the 
vertical grade separation that will be allowed. The reason that you have been required to 
backup and pave in 'blocks' is to meet the contract requirements concerning vertical 
grade separation" and was "not due to [MVC's] direction."); Trial Ex. 41; 1424:691 (a 
final estimate in which MVC agreed it had been paid all monies to which it was 
entitled).) 
12
 MVC's Rule 30(b)(6) representative testified that MVC never provided UDOT notice 
that it considered UDOT to have altered the project. (R. 1424:553-54.) This explains 
why, to rule in MVC's favor, the trial court paradoxically had to find that UDOT and 
MVC witnesses "were not knowledgeable witnesses as it relates to . . . contract 
interpretation issues pertaining to the placement of asphalt paving." (R. 1508.) 
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performed," and UDOT was "on notice that additional compensation will be required." 
Id. at 370. The notice provision in Thorn thus did not apply to the additional work. 
In contrast, here (i) MVC did not inform UDOT that the work was "additional 
work," (ii) UDOT did not agree "to pay for extra expenses," and (iii) UDOT was not on 
notice that "additional compensation would be required" because the engineer did not 
believe he had altered the project (nor did MVC). And MVC concedes that it never 
provided UDOT notice that the engineer altered the project. (R. 1424:553-54.) 
Thorn does not support the contention that Southwest's verbal complaint that its 
costs would be more than anticipated in its subcontract bid constitutes MVC's 
providing written notice that it believes the UDOT engineer materially altered the project 
such that additional compensation is warranted. The trial court erred in ruling that MVC 
had satisfied its contractual notice obligations. 
IV. UDOT Did Not Waive or Modify the Notice Provisions; Nor Is UDOT 
Estopped from Enforcing the Notice Provisions 
To avoid dismissing MVC's claim on the ground that it failed to comply with the 
notice provisions, the trial court invoked a number of legal doctrines—waiver, 
modification, estoppel. The factual findings that purportedly support the trial court's 
rulings involve interactions between UDOT and Southwest, not between UDOT and 
MVC. Again, the court's rulings presuppose MVC and Southwest as the same entity, 
which they are not, a fatal flaw that not only pervades the trial court's findings and 
This characterization is not uncharitable. In the response brief, MVC characterizes the 
notice as Southwest interpreting the specifications differently prior to its bid with MVC: 
"Southwest based its bid on the premise that it would be allowed to utilize the ribbon 
style method of paving throughout the entire 1-215 Project." (Resp. Br. at 3.) 
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MVC's arguments in the response brief, but leaves the arguments difficult to understand, 
difficult to frame, and therefore difficult to address. 
Before discussing the various legal doctrines, it is worth keeping in mind the 
relevant timeline UDOT set forth in the opening brief, which MVC does not dispute. 
(Opening Br. at 36-37.) On June 12,2003, the UDOT engineer informed MVC and 
Southwest that ribbon paving was not permitted. Under the subcontract, Southwest had 
to provide MVC written notice within 48 hours—by June 14, 2003—that it believed this 
altered the project to obligate MVC, in turn, to provide similar notice to UDOT. Under 
the general contract, MVC had to provide UDOT written notice of the alteration within 5 
days—by June 17, 2003—to avoid waiving any right to additional compensation. Thus, 
the events relevant to waiver, modification, or estoppel must have occurred prior to June 
17, 2003, or must have retroactive effect, neither of which is supported by the findings of 
fact in this case. 
A. UDOT Did Not Waive MVC's Notice Obligations 
In the response brief, MVC defends the trial court's waiver rulings on 4 grounds. 
First, MVC argues that UDOT "acted in a manner inconsistent with its contractual rights 
by orally responding to [Southwesfs] complaints regarding paving methods and by 
dealing informally and directly with Southwest personnel on paving methods issues 
instead of dealing directly with MVC." (Resp. Br. at 44.) If what MVC means by 
"orally responding" is consistently declining Southwest's requests to ribbon pave, then 
the UDOT engineer "orally responded," but this fact has no legal significance. (R. 1520.) 
When the UDOT engineer prohibited Southwest from ribbon paving, (i) the engineer 
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believed the prohibition was consistent with the project specifications, (ii) Southwest 
believed it was inconsistent with the specifications, and (iii) MVC took no position.14 
Under these circumstances, the engineer's verbal prohibition triggers Southwest's 
obligation to provide notice to MVC; the prohibition could not have waived Southwest's 
obligation to provide notice to MVC or waived MVC's obligation to provide notice to 
UDOT. An event that triggers a contractual obligation to provide notice cannot also 
extinguish that contractual obligation to provide notice. 
Second, MVC argues that "UDOT created an informal non-threatening 
atmosphere where it attempted to informally resolve paving disputes directly with 
Southwest." (Resp. Br. at 44.) Assuming that denying Southwest's requests to ribbon 
pave could create an "informal atmosphere,"15 such an atmosphere was specifically 
contemplated in the general contract, which encouraged a "volunteer partnering" 
relationship among UDOT, MVC, and Southwest, but stated that this relationship "does 
This undermines MVC's contention that "there was clearly a dispute as to what 
methods of paving the contract allowed for." (Resp. Br. at 44.) If by "dispute," MVC 
means Southwest disagreed with the UDOT engineer that the contract specifications 
prohibited ribbon paving, then there was a dispute. However, the dispute was not 
between UDOT and MVC, as MVC admits that it never communicated to UDOT that it 
disagreed with the engineer's interpretation of the project. 
15
 The specific finding of fact is: "By dealing directly with Southwest personnel on 
paving issues, including methods of paving, and verbally directing Southwest on what 
methods of paving to utilize on the Project, UDOT created an informal, nonthreatening 
atmosphere on the 1-215 Project in that it attempted to informally resolve paving disputes 
directly with Southwest without requiring strict compliance with contractual notice 
provisions (i.e., verbally directing Southwest to continue block paving when notified of 
the impacts instead of requiring that a written claim be made)." (R. 1512.) 
The evidentiary support for an "informal atmosphere," articulated in numbered 
paragraphs 14 to 29 in the response brief (pages 8-11) recites everything UDOT did to 
create this atmosphere, and these paragraphs contain nothing more than UDOT "verbally 
directing Southwest on paving issues." As for MVC, at most "MVC's Project 
Superintendent, witnesses some of these conversations." (Resp. Br. at 11.) 
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not relieve either party from any of the terms of the Contract." (Add. B, Trial Ex. 103 at 
52.) MVC does not address this provision in the response brief, but the provision is 
dispositive. 
Moreover, because the creation of any "informal atmosphere" occurred after June 
17, 2003—the date by which MVC had to comply with the notice provisions—the 
atmosphere could not have induced MVC to fail to comply with the notice provisions. 
The atmosphere also could not have lulled MVC into believing that it need not comply 
with the notice provisions because, as MVC conceded at trial, it knew it had to comply 
with the notice provisions.16 In other words, just as MVC could not have provided notice 
that it believed the engineer altered the project because MVC did not believe the engineer 
altered the project, MVC could not have been induced into believing it need not comply 
with the notice provisions because MVC knew that it had to comply with the notice 
provisions. The findings of the district court concerning Southwest do not support its 
rulings that UDOT waived its right to enforce the notice provisions against MVC. 
Third, MVC argues that "UDOT misrepresented to Southwest" that UDOT had 
not permitted ribbon paving on other projects. (Resp. Br. at 45.) While this 
misrepresentation could conceivably have relevance to whether the project specifications 
prohibited ribbon paving, it is difficult to understand what relevance it has to the notice 
provisions. What MVC and the trial court never explain is (i) how such a representation 
to Southwest constitutes a representation to MVC or (ii) how a representation made after 
a project could retroactively induce reasonable reliance by MVC or constitute an 
16
 "And is it your understanding that Meadow Valley was required to promptly notify the 
engineer of any alleged changes to the contract? Yes." (R. 1424:552.) 
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"intentional relinquishment" by UDOT before the project. (R. 1507.) Again, a 
representation to Southwest by an unspecified UDOT representative after the project 
could not operate retroactively to waive MVC's obligation to comply with the contractual 
notice provisions before the project. 
Fourth, MVC argues that "by considering the merits of [MVC's] claims and 
deciding those claims on their merits, UDOT waived and is estopped from claiming that 
[MVC] failed to comply with the notice provisions." (Resp. Br. at 47.) The trial court 
found that while the UDOT engineer's response to MVC's belated claim "addressed the 
lack of strict compliance with the contract's notice requirements, the decision of the 
UDOT Claims Board of Review makes no mention of lack of notice but addresses only 
the merits of [MVC's] claims." (R. 1513.) 
As UDOT pointed out in the opening brief, when MVC submitted its claim to the 
review board, the UDOT engineer submitted UDOT's formal response, in which UDOT 
argued that MVC waived any claim because MVC had failed to comply with the notice 
provisions. (R. 1513.) For this reason alone, UDOT did not waive this defense. MVC's 
only response is that the review board itself is also UDOT (Resp. Br. at 49), a position 
that would leave UDOT both taking the position that MVC waived its claim (via the 
engineer) and not taking the position that MVC waived its claim (via the review board), 
an absurd result. At trial, MVC recognized that because the review board membership 
includes an independent contractor, any decision "isn't just a UDOT decision at the 
claims board of review level." (R. 1424:588.) MVC was correct at trial. 
1 7 
"To constitute waiver, there must be an existing right, benefit or advantage, a 
knowledge of its existence, and an intention to relinquish it." Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret 
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n. 857 P.2d 935, 942 (Utah 1993). 
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If this court were to accept MVC's argument in the response brief, then in the 
future UDOT must treat the independent review board as part of UDOT and require it to 
recommend that UDOT deny all claims on procedural grounds to ensure that UDOT does 
not waive any defenses in subsequent litigation. Review boards were designed to resolve 
claims without litigation, not to frame claims for litigation. 
The only other argument MVC raises is that the UDOT deputy director "adopted" 
the review board's decision, thereby making it UDOT's position. (Resp. Br. at 48.) The 
review board recommended that the deputy director deny MVC's claim because the 
UDOT engineer had correctly interpreted the project specifications. (R. 1424:587-88.) 
The UDOT deputy director then refused to approve any additional compensation. 
(R. 153.) A copy of the deputy director's letter is attached at Addendum 2. Contrary to 
MVC's contention, the letter does not "adopt" the recommendation of the review board. 
Instead, the letter instructs MVC to contact another UDOT representative for an 
explanation of the denial of MVC's claim. (Add. 2.) UDOT did not waive its right to 
enforce the notice provisions when the review board disagreed with MVC on the merits 
of its claim. 
For all of these reasons, MVC's arguments that UDOT is prohibited from 
enforcing the notice provisions fail as a matter of law. 
B. UDOT Did Not Modify the Notice Provisions 
UDOT also did not modify the notice provisions to allow a third party's verbal 
notice to satisfy MVC's written notice obligation. MVC argues that by prohibiting 
Southwest from ribbon paving, UDOT modified the notice provisions that are triggered 
when the UDOT engineer alters the project. (Resp. Br. at 49-50.) In other words, the 
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UDOT engineer's directing Southwest to pave in a manner that altered the project 
somehow operated to relieve MVC of its obligation to notify UDOT whenever MVC 
believed the engineer had directed a subcontractor to act in a manner that altered the 
project. This modification theory makes no sense. Conduct that triggers a notice 
obligation cannot also modify the notice provision to extinguish the notice obligation. 
Moreover, MVC's Rule 30(b)(6) representative testified that MVC understood it 
had to comply with the notice provisions. (R. 1424:552-55.) MVC's understanding that 
it had to comply with the notice provisions, coupled with UDOT's similar understanding, 
undermines any argument that the provision was modified because UDOT and MVC are 
the only two parties to the general contract. The trial court erred in ruling that UDOT 
modified the contract. 
C. UDOT Is Not Estopped From Enforcing the Notice Provisions 
UDOT also is not estopped from enforcing the notice provisions. Under Utah law, 
estoppel requires "a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party inconsistent 
with a claim later asserted" that induces "reasonable action or inaction by the other party 
taken or not taken on the basis of the first party's statement, admission, act or failure to 
act," and a resulting "injury to the second party that would result from allowing the first 
party to contradict or repudiate such statement, admission, act, or failure to act." 
Youngblood v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2007 UT 28, ^  14, 158 P.3d 1088 
MVC's argument concerning estoppel is revealing: "UDOT's repeated directives 
to [Southwest] to proceed with work caused [MVC] to reasonably believe that there was 
no need to provide written notice to UDOT since UDOT had already made up its mind on 
the issue of what paving methods it was going to allow." (Resp. Br. at 51.) Not only 
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does this statement ignore the fact that providing notice results in someone other than the 
UDOT engineer (the review board and deputy director) reviewing the alleged alteration, 
it also, again, contradicts the testimony of MVC s Rule 30(b)(6) representative that MVC 
understood it had to comply with the notice provisions. (R. 1424:552-55.) MVC could 
not have relied upon UDOT's directives to Southwest in forming a belief that MVC need 
not comply with the notice provisions because MVC never believed that it need not 
comply with the notice provisions. The trial court also erred in its estoppel rulings. 
Conclusion 
This court should reverse on three separate grounds. First, the only plaintiff in this 
lawsuit, MVC, incurred no damages, and therefore, cannot recover damages. Second, the 
only breach of contract ruling is that UDOT breached the general contract by altering the 
project; but the general contract expressly permits UDOT to alter the project. Third, 
MVC waived any right to additional compensation by failing to comply with the notice 
provisions in the general contract. And because MVCs Rule 30(b)(6) representative 
testified that MVC understood that it had to comply with the notice provisions, and failed 
to do so, the trial court's various rulings that UDOT waived, modified, or is estopped 
from enforcing the notice provisions fail as a matter of law. 
This court should reverse the judgment entered in favor of MVC and remand with 
instructions to enter judgment in favor of UDOT. 
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UDOT's Response Brief Regarding MVC's Cross-Appeal 
Issue 1: Whether the trial court's interpretation of ambiguous contract language is 
clearly erroneous where one contracting party (UDOT) interprets the language the same 
way as the trial court and the other contracting party (MVC) takes no position on the how 
to interpret the language. 
Standard of Review: MVC states that the standard of review is correctness 
because the trial court's interpretation constitutes a "legal conclusion regarding a 
contract." (Resp. Br. at 2.) This is incorrect. The trial court found that the language was 
ambiguous—specifically, "less than clear"—and resolved the ambiguity in favor of 
1 R 
UDOT by finding that UDOT's interpretation was "more reasonable." (Resp Br. at 56 
(emphasis added).) This court reviews a trial court's interpretation of an ambiguous 
contract with "all inferences that may be drawn therefrom in a light most supportive of 
the findings of the trier of fact." Kimball v. Campbell 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985). 
Issue 2: Whether the trial court clearly erred in rejecting MVC's view that 
prejudgment interest began accruing on November 11, 2003, even though UDOT made 
the final payment to MVC that it claims was less than it deserved on July 21, 2005. 
Standard of Review: While questions of whether to award prejudgment interest 
and what rate to apply in calculating prejudgment interest are questions of law, the 
question of when damages were incurred presents a question of fact reviewed under a 
clearly erroneous standard. Wilcox v. Anchor Wate Co., 2007 UT 39, U 9, 164 P.3d 353. 
1 O 
The fact that during trial the trial court implied that it considered the language 
unambiguous is irrelevant. 14th St. Gym, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2008 UT App 
127, T| 16, 183 P.3d 262 ("Regardless of the language used during the hearing, the 
language in the court's final written order controls.") 
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Argument 
I. The Trial Court Did Not Clearly Err in Interpreting the Thickness Provisions 
MVC has filed a cross-appeal challenging the trial court's ruling that UDOT 
correctly assessed penalties for thickness deficiencies in the paving, deficiencies that 
diminish the life of the pavement. MVC argues that the contract language governing 
thickness is ambiguous and the trial court erred in finding UDOT's interpretation of that 
language "more reasonable." (Resp. Br. at 56.) A copy of the confusing contract 
provisions related to thickness is attached at Addendum 3. 
According to MVC, the language governing thickness that requires pavement to be 
within 3/8 inch of specifications is most reasonably interpreted to provide that however 
many layers Southwest laid to reach 5 inches of asphalt, each layer need only be within 
3/8 inch of specifications. (Resp. Br. at 52-57.) For example, if MVC had laid the 
pavement in 3 layers, then the total thickness could have been less than 4 inches—3/8 
inch deficiency for each layer—even though the specifications call for a total of 5 inches 
of pavement. (R. 1424:677.) Yet MVC's counsel conceded that this interpretation aas a 
practical matter in the field, that does not pass the smell test for me," hardly an 
endorsement of the reasonableness of MVC's interpretation. (R. 1425:1043.) 
The trial court concluded it was "more reasonable" to interpret the thickness 
language to require the total pavement to be within 3/8 inch of 5 inches.19 (R. 1515-16.) 
The trial court's finding is not clearly erroneous. 
19
 In trial exhibit 111, which consists of drawings that were part of the general contract, 
the second drawing indicates that the total thickness of the asphalt must be 5 inches. 
(R. 1424:677.) As Brandon Squire testified, this 5 inch figure was intended to constitute 
the "TLA lift." (R. 1424:677.) As the trial court found, the parties agreed that the TLA 
would be laid in two lifts, a 3 inch lift and then a 2 inch lift. (R. 1515.) This agreement 
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As a threshold issue, UDOT notes that this court can affirm on a number of 
alternative grounds demonstrating that the trial court should have dismissed MVC's 
thickness penalty claim prior to trial. It is well settled that an appellate court may affirm 
a judgment "sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even 
though such ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be the basis of 
its ruling or action, and this is true even though such ground or theory is not urged or 
argued on appeal by appellee, was not raised in the lower court, and was not considered 
or passed on by the lower court." Bailey v. Bavles, 2002 UT 58, ^ 10, 52 P.3d 1158. 
First, when MVC assigned its claim concerning ribbon paving to Southwest, it did 
not include any claim concerning thickness penalties, and therefore, Southwest has no 
legal standing to prosecute this claim, which explains why the claim does not appear in 
MVC's complaint. The assignment defined the assigned claim as stemming from 
"UDOT's requirement that the block paving method be used." (R. 1184; Add. I.) 
Second, even if MVC had assigned the claim, MVC suffered no damages related 
to the thickness penalties, as all damages were incurred by Southwest. SME Indus., Inc. 
v. Thompson, Ventulett Stainback & Assocs., 2001 UT 54, f 30, 28 P.3d 669 ("because 
SME's implied warranty claim is an assigned claim, SME may not recover the damages it 
suffered"). At trial, MVC conceded that it suffered no loss as a result of the thickness 
penalty. (R. 1424:574 ("as a result of this price reduction did Meadow Valley pass on all 
these price reductions for thickness deficiency in the end to Southwest? Yes.").) 
did not alter the contract's requirement that "no individual sublot can show a deficient 
thickness of more than 3/8 inch." (R. 1515.) Based upon these findings, the trial court 
found that "UDOT's interpretation of the allowable deviation applies to the total 
thickness and not to each individual layer or lift, is the more reasonable interpretation." 
(R. 1515-16.) 
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Third, MVC's Rule 30(b)(6) representative testified that MVC formed "no opinion 
as to whether or how the thickness specification should be interpreted." (R. 1424:574.) 
If UDOT interpreted the thickness provision to require total pavement within 3/8 inch of 
the 5 inch requirement, and MVC took no position on the subject, it is difficult to 
understand how the trial court could have adopted any interpretation other than UDOT's 
because UDOT and MVC are the only parties to the contract. 
Even if each of these alternative grounds fails, however, this court should still 
affirm. The trial court's resolution of ambiguity in favor of UDOT is reviewed under a 
deferential standard. Nielsen v. Gold's Gvm. 2003 UT 37, H 7, 78 P.3d 600 ("If a 
contract is deemed ambiguous, and the trial court allows extrinsic evidence of intent, 
interpretation of the contract becomes a factual matter and our review is strictly 
limited.'5). Specifically, a trial court's interpretation of contract ambiguity is reviewed 
with "all inferences that may be drawn therefrom in a light most supportive of the 
findings of the trier of fact." Kimball v. Campbell 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985). 
Here, the trial court "agree[d] with UDOT's interpretation of the contract 
specification in that the average thickness of all sublots making up a TLA pavement lot 
cannot show a deficient thickness of more than 3/8" from the 5" total thickness specified 
for the TLA pavement." (R. 1525.) In the court's findings of fact, the court found as 
follows: "UDOT's interpretation that the allowable deviation applies to the total 
thickness and not to each individual layer or lift, is the more reasonable interpretation, as 
otherwise the potential total deviation in thickness could be multiplied by the number of 
layers or lifts and could result in a substantial deviation from the contract requirements." 
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(R. 1515-16.) In other words, MVC could not deviate 3/8 inch for each layer of asphalt, 
but could only deviate 3/8 inch from the total 5 inch thickness for the finished product. 
The trial court's finding is based in part upon the testimony of the UDOT 
engineer, Brandon Squire, that the price reduction is "based on total thickness specified," 
or the total 5 inches.20 (R. 1424:606.) Later, Mr. Squire testified that he informed MVC 
months before any objection to a thickness penalty that the specifications were intended 
to require measuring thickness based upon "3/8 inch of the total thickness specified 
which is five inches." (R. 1424:675.) Neither MVC nor Southwest stated that it 
interpreted the specifications differently—as permitting 3/8 inch deviation for each layer 
of asphalt instead of the finished product. (R. 1424:636.) Mr. Squire then discussed 
Exhibit 111, which shows the term "TLA" in the specifications refers to the entire 5 
inches, not each layer of payment. (1424:677-78; Trial Ex. 111.) Because the 
construction drawings attached to the contract indicate that the TLA refers to the entire 5 
inches, the 3/8 inch acceptable deviation was intended to apply to the entire 5 inches of 
pavement. 
The trial court then noted that Southwest5 s representative, Mr. Moehn, testified 
that a 10% deviation from the total thickness is the industry norm, and applying the 3/8 
inch deviation under MVC's interpretation would result in a 15% deviation, something 
counsel for MVC described as "a big tolerance from a practical standpoint from the 
field." (R. 1425:1045.) The trial court also noted that MVC had failed to provide any 
evidence that the thickness specifications had ever been interpreted as MVC was urging. 
The trial court did not agree with Mr. Squire with regard to certain aspects of the 
interpretation. (R. 1425:1047.) 
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(R. 1425:1045-46.) Finally, Mr. Moehn testified that MVC could make up any thickness 
deficiency in one layer of payment "on subsequent lifts," which could only be true if the 
parties intended any thickness penalties to be determined by measuring the thickness of 
the total paved surface. (Pv. 1424:899.) Therefore, not only is there factual support for 
the trial court's interpretation, there is evidence that Southwest (the only entity to testify 
in favor of the interpretation advanced by MVC's counsel) agreed with UDOT. 
For all of these reasons, this court should affirm the trial court's ruling that MVC 
is not entitled to damages related to UDOT's assessing a penalty for the thickness of the 
pavement. 
II. The Trial Court Did Not Clearly Err In Rejecting MVC's Date of Accrual for 
Prejudgment Interest of November 11, 2003, Because the Final Payment to 
MVC Under the Contract Did Not Occur Until After July 21, 2005 
MVC also argues that the trial court should have awarded prejudgment interest 
beginning on November 11, 2003, the date Mr. Moehn of Southwest testified that he 
calculated the increased costs associated with block paving. (Resp. Br. at 60.) The trial 
court rejected this date and instead found that prejudgment interest began accruing on 
November 1, 2004, the date MVC first filed a claim seeking additional compensation. 
(R. 1516.) While the trial court's finding does not correspond to when MVC incurred the 
damages, the trial court's mistake resulted in MVC being awarded too much prejudgment 
interest, and therefore, there is no basis for this court to reverse the trial court's award of 
prejudgment interest via MVC's cross-appeal. 
As MVC points out in the response brief, under Utah law prejudgment interest 
begins accruing from the date the "damage is complete." (Resp. Br. at 58.) To apply this 
standard as MVC urges on appeal, this court first must conclude that (i) MVC incurred 
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damages, which, as demonstrated above, it did not; and (ii) even though the trial court did 
not rule that UDOT breached the contract by failing to pay MVC additional 
compensation, the trial court nonetheless ruled that UDOT breached the contract by 
failing to pay MVC additional compensation. (Supra at 5-12.) Only if this court holds in 
favor of MVC on these issues does MVC's cross-appeal concerning prejudgment interest 
become ripe. 
Regardless, to the extent MVC incurred any damages, it did not incur those 
damages until UDOT either rejected MVC's claim for additional compensation or made 
the final payment to MVC that did not include additional compensation. UDOT rejected 
MVC's claim for additional compensation on April 26,2005. (R. 153.) UDOT made a 
final payment to MVC after July 21, 2005, the date on which MVC signed a "final 
estimate" in which it agreed that, other than $32,650.42 that UDOT subsequently paid, 
UDOT had paid MVC all compensation it owed MVC. (Trial Ex. 41.) Both of these 
dates are after the date on which the trial court found that prejudgment interest began 
accruing, November 1, 2004. (R. 1516.) Therefore, this court should reject MVC's 
argument that prejudgment interest began accruing on November 11, 2003. 
Conclusion 
This court should affirm the judgment entered in favor of UDOT. The trial court 
did not clearly err in resolving any ambiguity in favor of UDOT not only because MVC's 
representative did not dispute UDOT's interpretation but also because Southwest's 
representative agreed with UDOT's interpretation. In addition, the trial court did not 
clearly err in rejecting MVC's position that prejudgment interest began accruing on 
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November 11, 2003, nearly two years before UDOT refused to pay the additional 
compensation that MVC claims on appeal constitute its damages. 
This court should affirm the judgment entered in favor of UDOT, reverse the 
judgment in favor of MVC, and remand with instructions to enter judgment in favor of 
UDOT on all claims. 
DATED this 21st day of October, 2009. 
SNELL & WILMER L.L.P. 
Troy L. Bdtfher 
Attorney for Utah Department of Transportation 
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CLAIMS PROSECUTION AND TOLLING AGREEMENT 
This Claims Prosecution and Tolling Agreement ("Agreement") is effective the 1* 
day of July, 2004, by and between MEADOW VALLEY CONTRACTORS, INC. 
CMVCr-), FISHER INDUSTRIES, INC. ("Fisher") and LIBERTY MUTUTAL 
INSUARANCE COMPANY (liberty). 
RECITALS 
WHEREAS, the Utah Department of Transportation and the State of Utah 
(collectively referred to hereafter as "UDOT) awarded MVCI the prime contract to 
complete the project Known as the 1-215 South Interchange Project 
IM-NH-215-8(102)10 rPrqjecT); 
WHEREAS, MVCi am) Fisher entered into a Purchase Agreement to furnish 
materials and supplies to the Project and, in addition, entered info a Subcontract -
Agreement to furnish and install paving and related materials in accordance with the 
Project's plans and specifications. Both the Purchase Agreement and Subcontract 
Agreement are hereinafter sometimes collectively referred to as "Project Agreements 
WHEREAS, Fisher has requested an equitable adjustment and additional 
compensation due to claimed increased costs related to UDOTs requirement that the 
block paving method be used in the performanco of the Project Agreements rather than 
the continuous wide open rfcbon paving method which Fisher sought io use ("Block 
Paving Claim"); 
WHEREAS, the Block Paving Claim rs further described in the Block Paving Cost 
Analysis prepared by Michael Moehnand dated November i t . 2003 which Cost 
Analysis is referred to herein for identification and information purposes with the 
understanding that said Block Paving Claim may be modified at Fishers sole discretion. 
By executing this Agreement, MVCI does not acknowledge that such analysis is 
accurate or valid; 
WHEREAS, MVCI is unable to determine whether the Bloc* Paving Claim has 
merit, but is wiling to permit Fisher to prosecute the Block Paving Claim in the name of 
MVCI against UDOT under the procedures set forth in the prime contract and in 
accordance with the terms and conditions set forth herein; 
WHEREAS, MVCI and Fisher claim to have claims, cross claims and/or 
defenses against one another and acknowledge that Rsher has requested additional 
compensation related to the source, quantity and quality of TLA materials to be used in 
the construction of the Project as provided for in both Agreements corner Claims"). By 
executing this Agreement. MVCI does not acknowledge responsibility for any such 
claim of Fisher or acknowledge that such request is valid or timely, 
WHEREAS, MVCI and Fisher desire to preserve and toll their Other Claims 
against each other as provided for herein; 
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WHEREAS, absent thfs Agreement, the parties would further assert and 
prosecute the Block Paving Claim and the Other Claims against one another; and 
WHEREAS, the parties desire to avoid litigation among themselves subject to 
ih& terms of mis Agreement 
AGREEMENT 
NOW, THEREFORE, for valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of 
which are hereby acknowledged, MVCl and Fisher agree as follows: 
1- Assignment and Authority to Prosecuie Block Paving Cffim. MVCl 
assigns and grants Fisher the right 10 prosecute and/or negotiate, settle or compromise 
the Block Paving Claim, by way of lawsuit, administrative, mediation or arbitration 
proceeding. 
2, Tofling. 
a. MVCl, Liberty and Fisher, and each for itself, its agents, 
predecessors, successors and assigns, agree that the running of any stature of 
limitations imposed by any statute, rule or other time bar defense with regard to the 
Other Claims shall be suspended until sixty days from the date of the entry of a final 
settlement or final and non-appealable order by a Court of appropriate jurisdiction with 
respect to the Btock Paving Claim (the •'Suspension Period"). 
b. MVCf Liberty and Fisher, and each for itself, its agenis. 
successors and assigns, therefore, expressly jofj and preserve all of thfefr Other Claws 
and defenses, and waive and relinquish any right to assert that the time period 
prescribed by any statute of limitations, whether legal or equitable, has expired. 
c It is the parties' intention that each party hereto shall be in the 
same position w>tn respect to the Other Claims at U\B termination of the Suspension 
period, including, but not limited to, any applicable statute of limitations or time bar 
defenses, as on the Effective Date of this Agreement 
3. Block Paving Claim Prosecution. 
a. Excluding the Block Paving Claim and the Other Claims. Fisher 
acknowledges that it has been paid for work performed to date on the Project as 
required by the Subcontract, except for a final progress payment and retention. These 
amounts win be released to Fisher in accordance with the Subcontract, and nothing 
contained herein shall affect Fisher's right to those funds. 
b. MVCl hereby assigns and conveys to Fisher the right to prosecute, 
negotiate, settle, and otherwise pursue the Block Paving Claim against UDOT in the 
name of MVCl under the terms of the Prime Contract with UDOT. Fisher shall be 
responsible for taking all steps necessary to prosecute, negotiate, mediate or settle the 
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B|ocK Paving Claim, and shall retain counsel of its chojca Fisher agrees to pay all 
related fees, COSTS, and expenses in connection therewith. MVCJ shall assist Fisher tn 
the claims presentation and prosecution by providing applicable documents and 
testimony of MVC| personnel, provided Fisher shall pay all costs of travel, lodging and 
meals, incurred by MVCI to make such personnel available for testimony. 
c. In prosecuting the Block Paving Claim, Fisher agrees to seek the 
recovery of MVCl's profit overhead, and bond markups and all taxes that will be due on 
the Recovery, all of which MVCI is entitled to receive less its share of Fishers 
prosecution cosrs as hereinafter defined CMVCI Recovery"). 
d. Fisher shall be entitled to negotiate, settle, or compromise any and 
all aspects of the Block Paving Claim and any UDOT claimed setoff in connection 
therewith, and shall further be entitled to receive the amount of any judgment or award 
made in connection with the Block Paving Claim less the amount of the MVCI 
Recovery {-Fisher Recovery"). 
e. Fisher shall be entitled to deduct from the MVCI Recovery 15% of 
Fisher's Claim preparation and prosecution costs, which shall include Fisher's travel, 
discovery, attorneys fees, fact, expert and consulting fees, and arbitration, mediation, 
and/or litigation costs (collectively referred to as the "Prosecution Costs*). 
f. With respect to the Block Paving Claim, and limited opty to said 
claim, Fisher agrees to be bound to MVCI to the same extent that MVGi is shown to be 
bound to UDOT, both by the terms and procedures of the Prime Contract and by any 
and all decisions or determinations made thereunder by any Arbitrator and/or Court. 
MVCI shall be responsible for any setoffs and claims asserted by UpOT solely against 
MVCI which do not involve Fisher and which do not arise under or relate to the Block 
Paving Claim, and agrees to defend at its cost and with Hs omrn counsel all such setoffs 
and claims. 
g. This Agreement is intended to resolve aQ aspects of the Block 
Pavjng Claim as between Fisher and MVCI in connection with the Project In the event 
Fisher recovers any amounts or does not actually recover sny amounts from UDOT on 
the Block Paving Claim after a disposition on the merits, MVCI and liberty will have no 
liability to Fisher with respect to the Block Paving Claim- Fisher, however, shall not be 
responsible for Counterclaims or setoffs solely against MVCI which do not involve 
Fisher and which do not arise untier or relate to the Block Paving Claim* Fisher agrees 
to indemnify MVCI from any award of attorneys1 fees or costs that may be awarded to 
UDOT arising under or related to the Block Paving Claim and any counterclaim or setoff 
for which Fisher may be responsible in whole or in part 
h. MVCI and Fisher both agree that UDOT is solely responsible for 
amounts, if any, due on the Block Paving Claim and this Agreement is not an admission 
of any independent liability of either Fisher or MVCI, 
4. Authority. The signature of any person to this Agreement shall constitute 
an acknowledgment, stipulation and warranty by such person that such person has the 
•3-
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authority to bind the entity for which such person purports to sign this Agreement 
5 Breach. In the event of a breach of this Agreement, the prevailing party 
shall be entitled to collect afl expenses incurved in pursuing or defending the action 
including, but not limited to, afl attorneys fees, expert fees and costs incurred in 
connection with the enforcement of this Agreement 
6- Waiver. No failure to exercise any lights or privileges granted hereunder 
or to insist upon the full performance of ajl obligations assumed by the other party 
hereto shall be construed as waiving any such rights, privileges, obligations, or duties. 
or as creating any custom contrary hereto, further, any such waiver; to be enforceable, 
must be in writing and shall not extend to or operate beyond the express term thereof. 
7. Modification, This Agreement contains the entire agreement between the 
parties and no statement, promises, or inducements made by either party or agent of 
either party that is not contained in this written contract shall be valid or binding. 
Furthermore, this Agreement shall supersede all previous communications, 
representations, <# agreements, either verbal or written, between the parties hereto. 
This Agreement may not be enlarged, modified, or altered in any way except in writing 
signed by the parties hereto and endorsed hereon, 
8. Severability. It is understood and agreed by the parties that if any part, 
term, or provision of this Agreement is determined by the couits or an aibitratorfs) to be 
illegal or in conflict with any law of the state where made or any other term herein, the 
validity of the remaining portions or provisions shad not be affected, and the rights and 
obligations of the parties shall be construed and enforced as if the contract did not 
contain the particular part. term, or provision held to be invalid or in conflict 
9 Governing Law. This Agreement shall be governed by the laws of the 
State of Utah, both as to interpretation and performance. 
10. Mediation. Any issue or dispute regarding the interpretation or 
enforcement of this Agreement shall be first mediated in accordance with the American 
Arbitration Association's Construction Industry Rules of Mediation with each of the 
parties sharing ib one half of the fees and costs incurred in connection therewith. The 
mediation shall be conducted in Salt take City, Utah* 
12. Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed in two or more 
counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original, but all of which taken together 
snail constitute one and the same instrument. 
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above. 
w r t
^ s s vtfi£i6c£ this AgreemsnM* roa<j«reffe<#ve oa of tn* dpfe fii^-ssfcftfrth 
FISHER INDUSTRIES, INC. 
MEADOW VAtl-EV CONTRACTORS, INC. 
By:, >^A^, 
'/"ce-.-Ffeg^/^SA/T^ 
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In witness whereof, this Agreement is made effective as of the date first set forth 
above. 
FISHER INDUSTRIES, INC 
fa. By: 
Its: ^ P ^ S / p c T ^ r 
MEADOW VALLEY CONTRACTORS, INC. 
By:, 
tts: 
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY 
By: A ^ n ^ ^ Jjij^M-J 
Its: O^MAjLtL hfixLsscA J?jUdX> 
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ale of Utah 
I HUNTSMAN* JR. 
*YR ItHKHhRT 
Itenaal GtrVcinor 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 
JOHNR NJORP.P.E. 
Exec utlve Vim tor 
CARLOS M KRACRRAS, RE. 
/Vpufy Dutitor 
April 26, 2005 
Mr. Cody W. Wilson 
Babcock, Scott & Babcock 
Eighth Floor 
51 West South Temple 
Salt Lake City UT 84101 
RR: IM-NII-215-9U 02)10 
1-215, Redwood Road to 300 East 
Crack & Seat, Overlay, Widening, Structures, & Noise Walls 
Dear Mr. Wilson, 
We have received your loiter dated Tuesday, April 19, 2005, stating that pursuant to Special Provision 
Specification Section 00727S - Part 1.25 (D) "Meadow Valley has failed to receive an offer of 
settlement." 
A letter dated Febmary 11, 2005, was sent to Kent B, Scott from the Utah Department of Transportation 
(LiDOT), which outlined the Claims Review Hoard's ruling. The letter was sent well within the 45 
calendar days outlined in Special Provision Specification Section 00727S - Part 1.25(D). The Board's 
mling was against Meadow Valley on all three claims issues. The Board's decision requires no offer. 
Wc also received a letter from you dated February 23, 2005, asking for a supplementary and exhaustive 
explanation concerning the Claims Review Board's ruling. UDOT responded to you in a March 2, 2005, 
letter saying if you would like further explanation, you should contact Mr. Jim McMinimee at 801-965-
4022. Please avail yourself of this offer should you require further clarification. 
Again, if you have additional questions, please feel free to contact Mr. McMinimee 
Carlos M, Bracera 
Deputy Director 
CMB/JCM/la 
cc: James C. McMinimee, UDOT Project Development 
Darrell Giannonalli, UDOT Construction 
Jimmy Ilolfdtz, UDOT Internal Audit 
Jim Beadles, UDOT Attorney 
Waylund Ludlow, Claims Review Board, Geneva Rock 
Kent B. Scott, Babcock, Scott & Babcock 
Caivm Rampiort Complex, 4501 Somh 2700 WCM. Salt I akc City. Utah $1119-5998 




A. A lot equals the number of tons of HMA placed during each production day. The 
Department will: 
1. Divide each lot into four sublots based on the scheduled production day. 
2. Take random samples behind the paver before any further compaction, and 
determine random numbers/locations from a random numbers table. ASTM 
D 3665, UDOT Materials Manual of Instruction Part 8-984: Sampling 
Methods. 
a. Take large enough samples for paired-T testing and split with 
contractor designated lab until testing discrepancies (based on tests 
outlined in article 3.9 "Dispute Resolution," paragraph Bl, in addition 
to daily acceptance tests for mix properties) between labs are identified 
and resolved. 
3. Inform the Contractor of the time and place for the sample not more than 15 
minutes prior to the sampling. 
4. Conduct the following tests: 
a. Asphalt Binder Content: One per sublot using ignition oven. 
AASHTO T 308 
b. Aggregate gradation: One test per sublot on the residue of the ignition 
oven tests. AASHTO T 30. 
c. VMA: 3 tests per lot. AASHTO T 312 
5. Perform three Rice tests for each lot. Use the average for the lot to determine 
density of cores taken by the Contractor. 
6. Determine thickness of cores taken by the Contractor. 
7. Add the lot to the previous day's production if the minimum number of 
samples cannot be obtained for the final day's production and evaluate with 
the appropriate sample size. 
8. Add the lot to the next day's production if the minimum number of samples 
cannot be obtained, and evaluate with the appropriate sample size. 
9. Retest the lot if an individual test from a sublot is deemed an outlier based on 
ASTM E 178. 
B. The Engineer conducts the acceptance testing for asphalt binder content, 
gradation, VMA, density, and thickness. AASHTO T 30, T 308, PP 28, T 166, 
ASTM D 3549 For small projects with plan quantities of HMA less than 
3000 tons, or for work such as utility work, traffic signals, detours, or lane 
leveling, the Engineer may elect to accept material based upon visual inspection. 
1. When acceptance is intended to be based upon visual inspection, the Engineer 
reserves the option of conducting any acceptance tests necessary to determine 
the material and workmanship meets the project requirements. 
C. Obtain samples for density and thickness. 
1. Divide the lot into five sublots of approximately equal sizes. 
Hot Mix Asphalt (HMA) 
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2. Obtain ten cores per lot randomly as instructed, and in the presence of the 
Engineer within two days after the pavement is placed. 
3. Comply with AASHTOT 166. 
4. If the random location for cores falls within one foot of the edge of the overall 
pavement section (outer part of shoulders), then move transversely to a point 
one foot from the edge of the pavement. 
5. Fill core holes with an acceptable asphalt mixture and compact. 
6. The Department will take possession of the cores immediately, and will begin 
testing the cores within 24 hours for density acceptance. 
Density: The target density for determining acceptance and incentive/disincentive 
is 93.5 percent of maximum Rice density for projects where design overlay 
thickness is greater than 2 inches. For projects where design overlay thickness is 
2 inches or less, target density for determining acceptance and incentive/ 
disincentive is 92.5 percent of maximum Rice density. AASHTOT 209. For 
small projects with plan quantities of HMA less than 3000 tons, or for work such 
as utility work, traffic signals, detours, or lane leveling, and when material is to be 
accepted on the basis of visual inspection per article 1.4 "Acceptance," paragraph 
B, acceptance for density may be based upon establishing and maintaining a roller 
pattern to obtain maximum density without over-stressing the pavement. 
1. Obtain a minimum of two density determinations on a random basis for each 
sublot.ASTMD3665. 
2. When samples for gradation, asphalt binder content and VMA from lots are 
combined according to Part 3, article 3.9 "Dispute Resolution," in order to 
obtain an appropriate sample size for evaluation, a lot for density 
determination is defined as the combined production days. 
Thickness: Base acceptance on the average thickness of a lot.\A thickness lot 
equals a density lotS<Divide a thickness lot into five sublots equal to density 
sublots. Thickness acceptance for thin lift projects (2 inches or less) consists of 
checking thickness regularly with a depth probe during placement and taking 
corrective action as necessary. 
1. Take a minimum of two randomly selected thickness tests within each sublot. 
2. The same core samples taken for density may be used for thickness 
verification. 
3. The Department accepts a lot when: 
a. The average thickness of all sublots is not more than 1/2 inch greater 
nor 1/4 inch less than the total thickness specified. 
b. No individual sublot shows a deficient thickness of more than 3/8 inch. 
c. Place additional materials where lots or sublots are deficient in 
thickness. The minimum depth of compacted surface for correcting 
deficient thickness is 3 times the nominal maximum aggregate size. 
d. The Department pays for the quantity of additional material to bring 
the surface to design grade. 
Hot Mix Asphalt (HMA) 
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e. The Department does not pay for the quantity of additional material 
above the design grade due to the minimum paving thickness required. 
f. The Engineer may allow excess thickness to remain in place or may 
order its removal. Remove and replace the entire depth of the course, if 
it is necessary to remove portions of the course 
g. The Department pays for 50 percent of the mix in excess of the +1/2 
inch tolerance when excess thickness is allowed to remain in place. 
h. The thickness tolerances established above do not apply to leveling 
courses. However, check final surfaces in stage construction. 
F. Smoothness Tests 
1. Determine acceptance and correct in accordance with Section 01452. 
G. Cease production when any two out of three consecutive lots have a net 
disincentive or the air voids averaged for each lot are not between 3 and 5 percent 
for any 2 out of 3 consecutive lots. 
1. Before production continues, submit a corrective action plan to the Engineer 
indicating the changes in production procedures that will be implemented to 
correct the deficiencies. 
H. The Department pays incentive/disincentive on the assessed quantities of HMA 
mix according to Table 1 Incentive/Disincentive for Gradation, Asphalt Binder 
Content and Density or Table 2 Incentive/Disincentive for VMA. Base the 
incentive/disincentive on Percent Within Limit (PT) computation using Tables 3, 
4, and 5. Use lowest single value combined for gradation (each of the sieves) and 
asphalt binder content. 
1. Meet PT of 88 or greater for density for eligibility for incentive in 
gradation/asphalt binder content and VMA. The Department does not pay 
incentive for gradation/asphalt binder content and VMA if the Contractor does 
not meet this condition. 
2. For small projects with plan quantities of HMA less than 3000 tons, or for 
work such as utility work, traffic signals, detours, or lane leveling, and when 
material is accepted on the basis of visual inspection per article 1.4 
"Acceptance," paragraph B, incentives/disincentives do not apply. 
I. The Department rejects the lot if the Percent Within Limits (PT) for any 
individual measurement is less than 60 percent. 
J. To reduce over-testing of small quantity production days, such as ramps or 
bridgework, the Engineer may, in concurrence with the Contractor, choose to 
combine production from several days to form a single lot. 
Hot Mix Asphalt (HMA) 
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Table 1 
Incentive/Disincentive for Gradation, Asphalt Binder Content and Density 
Gradation/Asphalt Binder Content 
FT 



























































Incentive/Disincentive for VMA 
PT Based on Minimum 
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Table 3 
Upper and Lower Limit Determination 
Parameter 
3/4 inch sieve for 1 inch HMA 
1/2 inch sieve for 3/4 inch HMA 
3/8 inch sieve for 1/2 inch HMA 
No. 4 sieve for 3/8 inch HMA 
No. 8 sieve 
No.50 sieve 
No. 200 sieve 
Asphalt Binder Content 
VMA Range 
Density 
UL and LL | 
Target Value ±6.0% 
Target Value ±5.0% 
Target Value ±3.0% 
Target Value ±2.0% 






Target Value - 2.0% 
Upper Limit: 
Target Value+ 3.0% 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Enter table in the appropriate sample size column and round down to the nearest value. 
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I Table 5 Definitions, Abbreviations, and Formulas for Acceptance 
Term 
Target Value (TV) 
Average (AVE) 
Standard Deviation (s) 
Upper Limit (UL) 
Lower Limit (LL) 
Upper Quality Index (QU) 
Lower Quality Index (QL) 
Percentage of Lot Within 
UL 
(PU) 
Percentage of Lot Within 
1 LL (PL) 
Total Percentage of Lot 




The target values for gradation, asphalt binder content and VMA 
are given in the Contractor's volumetric mix design. See article 
1.4, D., line E, for density target values. 
The sum of the lot's test results for a measured characteristic 
divided by the number of test results; the arithmetic mean. 
The square root of the value formed by summing the squared 
difference between the individual test results of a measured 
characteristic and AVE, divided by the number of test results 
minus one. This statement does not limit the methods of 
calculations of s; other methods that obtain the same value may 
be used. 
The value above the TV of each measured characteristic that 
defines the upper limit of acceptable production. (Table 3) 
The value below the TV of each measured characteristic that 
defines the lower limit of acceptable production (Table 3) 
l QU = (UL-AVE)/s 
QL = (AVE-LL)/s 
Determined by entering Table 4 with QU. 
Determined by entering Table 4 with QL. 
PT = (PU + PL)-100 
Determined by entering Table 1 and 2 with PT or PL. 
All values for AVE, s, QU, and QL will be calculated to two decimal place accuracy that will be carried 
through all further calculations. Rounding to lower accuracy is not allowed. 
Hot Mix Asphalt (HMA) 
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PART 2 PRODUCTS 
2.1 HMA ASPHALT BINDER 
A. Refer to Special Provision 02742S: Project Specific Surfacing Requirements 
B. Asphalt material: Refer to Section 02745 
C. Sampling procedure: UDOT Materials Manual of Instruction Part 8-209 
D. Asphalt Binder Management Plan: UDOT Materials Manual of Instruction Part 8-
209 
2.2 NATURAL ASPHALT MATERIAL 
A. Use a blend of 75% PG 58-34 as per Section 02745, and 25% natural asphalt as 
defined by the following: 
1. Natural Asphalt: Must be a naturally occurring asphalt from a reliable source that 
has been field tested and used on previous highway proj ects for several years and 
has the following characteristics: 
Specific Gravity (ASTM D-70) 
Penetration (ASTM D-5) 
Mineral Matter (Reduced to Ash) 
Softening Point (RB) (ASTM D-36) 
1 3 Minimum 
1 to 4 
35% to 39% 
190°F-210°F 
B. MeetAASHTOT40 
C. Refer to UDOT Materials Sampling and Testing Manual. 
D. Sampling procedure: UDOT Materials Manual of Instruction Part 8-209. 
E. Asphalt Binder Management Plan: UDOT Materials Manual of Instruction Part 8-
209 
2.3 AGGREGATE 
A. Refer to the Minimum Test Requirements. 
B. Crusher processed virgin aggregate material consisting of crushed stone, gravel, or 
slag. Conform to Section 02969 for recycled mixes. 
Hot Mix Asphalt (HMA) 
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